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Abstract With the popularity of cloud computing and mobile Apps, on-demand services such as on-line music or audio
streaming and vehicle booking are widely available nowadays. In order to allow efficient delivery and management of the
services, for large-scale on-demand systems, there is usually a hierarchy where the service provider can delegate its service
to a top-tier (e.g., countrywide) proxy who can then further delegate the service to lower level (e.g., region-wide) proxies.
Secure (re-)delegation and revocation are among the most crucial factors for such systems. In this paper, we investigate
the practical solutions for achieving re-delegation and revocation utilizing proxy signature. Although proxy signature has
been extensively studied in the literature, no previous solution can achieve both properties. To fill the gap, we introduce
the notion of revocable and re-delegable proxy signature that supports efficient revocation and allows a proxy signer to
re-delegate its signing right to other proxy signers without the interaction with the original signer. We define the formal
security models for this new primitive and present an efficient scheme that can achieve all the security properties. We
also present a secure on-line revocable and re-delegate vehicle ordering system (RRVOS) as one of the applications of our
proposed scheme.
Keywords revocation, (re)delegation, proxy signature
1 Introduction
Due to the popularity of cloud computing and smart
mobile devices, on-demand services, such as real-time
video and music services[1-2], are becoming more and
more popular nowadays. In order to provide better
(e.g., customized) services to customers located at diffe-
rent regions, the service provider usually will delegate
the right to provide the service to some local companies
who are either subsidiaries or proxies that are autho-
rized by the service provider. Moreover, there may exist
a hierarchy in the delegation list, e.g., a country-wide
delegatee can further delegate the right to regional del-
egatees. Such a multi-level delegation structure is more
efficient and practical for very large international on-
demand service applications.
In order to ensure that only the legitimate delega-
tees can provide the service (e.g., due to copyright or
service charge related issues), we should allow the end
users to efficiently verify whether the service provided
by a company is genuine or not. On the other hand,
it is possible that a legitimate delegatee may abuse
the delegated right (e.g., providing unauthorized ser-
vices) or refuse to pay the subscription fee. In such cir-
cumstances, the service provider or an upper-tier (e.g.,
country-wide) proxy should be able to revoke a misbe-
having regional delegatee.
Proxy signature[3-4] provides a solution for signing
right delegation and hence allows the service provider
to authorize the right of providing the prescribed ser-
vices to legitimate delegatees (i.e., proxy signers). One
fundamental security requirement of proxy signature is
that without the delegation, a proxy signer cannot pro-
duce a valid proxy signature. Hence, end users can
easily verify the legitimacy of a service by verifying the
proxy signature generated by the proxy signer. How-
ever, traditional proxy signature schemes, which will
be reviewed shortly in Subsection 1.1, cannot achieve
both re-delegation and efficient revocation simultane-
ously, which is the problem we aim to solve in this pa-
per.
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1.1 Proxy Signature
Mambo et al.[3-4] introduced the first proxy signa-
ture scheme in 1996. A proxy signature scheme consists
of three entities: original signer, proxy signer, and ver-
ifier. An original signer can generate a proxy signing
key, which will be sent to a proxy signer. The proxy
signer can then use this proxy signing key to sign mes-
sages on behalf of the original signer.
The delegation in a proxy signature scheme can
be classified into four types. The seminal work of
Mambo et al.[3] proposed three of them: full delega-
tion, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant. In
the full delegation, the original signer just gives its se-
cret key to the proxy signer as the proxy signing key.
Hence, the proxy signer and the original signer have the
same signing ability and there is no non-repudiation.
To conquer this drawback, partial delegation was also
proposed. In the partial delegation, the proxy sign-
ing key is derived from the private key of the original
signer and the public or secret key of the proxy signer.
There are two approaches to realize partial delegation,
namely, the proxy-unprotected and the proxy-protected
delegation[5]. In the case of the proxy-unprotected par-
tial delegation, the proxy signing key combines the se-
cret key of the original signer and the public key of the
proxy signer. Thus, the original signer can derive the
proxy signing key without interacting with the proxy
signer, but the proxy signer cannot obtain the proxy
signing key without the help from the original signer,
which leads to the problem that the original signer
can sign messages on behalf of the proxy signer. To
overcome the problem in the proxy-unprotected partial
delegation, the proxy-protected partial delegation was
proposed, which requires the generation of the proxy
signing key from the secret keys of both the original
signer and the proxy signer. However, the partial dele-
gable proxy signature still suffers the problem that the
proxy signer has unlimited signing ability. To over-
come this drawback, the concept of delegation by war-
rant was proposed. In the delegation by warrant, the
original signer signs a warrant which certifies the legit-
imacy of the proxy signer. To combine the advantages
of the partial delegation and the delegation by warrant,
Kim et al.[6] introduced a novel type of proxy delega-
tion called partial delegation with warrant. In recent
decades, many studies on proxy signature have been
proposed based on the RSA[5,7] or Diffie-Hellman[8-10]
assumptions.
Proxy signature schemes can also be categorized
into proxy multi-signature, multi-proxy signature, and
proxy re-delegation schemes. In a proxy multi-
signature scheme[11-12], a designated proxy signer can
generate a proxy signature on behalf of two or more
original signers. A multi-proxy signature scheme[7,13]
allows a group of original signers to delegate the sign-
ing capability to a designated group of proxy signers. In
the case of proxy re-delegation[14], it allows the proxy
signers to delegate the signing right to other proxy sign-
ers on behalf of the original signer.
1.2 Motivation
In this paper, we focus on designing proxy signature
with both proxy revocation and proxy re-delegation
that are important for many applications mentioned
above. Although there are many research studies on
proxy signature, only few of them deal with revocation
or re-delegation. Moreover, there is no proxy scheme in
the literature that can achieve both properties.
Proxy revocation is a critical issue when the proxy
signer is compromised. Furthermore, in reality, the
proxy signer may also misuse the delegated signing
right. In such situations, the original signer should be
able to revoke the proxy signing key delegated to the
proxy signer even before the delegation expires. One
straightforward solution to address this problem is to
let the original signer publish a white list or a black list,
and a verifier needs to check the list before verifying a
proxy signature. However, this solution is not practical
since the verifier needs to keep on updating the white
or black list before verifying a proxy signature. An-
other limitation of such an approach is that the proxy
signatures generated before the revocation also become
invalid. Ideally, such proxy signatures should still be
considered valid since the proxy signer is not revoked
when the signature was generated.
One solution proposed in the literature to address
the revocation problem is utilizing the time-stamp[13].
However, the proposed scheme has some security issues.
As pointed out in [15], an attacker can easily forge a
proxy signature.
Another solution for proxy revocation is to use a
third party. Seo et al.[16] and Liu et al.[17] proposed
to use a third party called security mediator (SEM)
which is a semi-trusted on-line server. The original
signer divides the proxy delegation into two parts and
gives these two parts to the proxy signer and SEM, re-
spectively. When the proxy signer wants to generate
a proxy signature, it needs the assistance from SEM
which works as a certifier to authenticate the signing
ability of every proxy signer. Similarly, Das et al.[15]
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and Lu et al.[18] proposed some revocable proxy sig-
nature schemes where a trusted third party called the
authentication server (AS) is used to provide the imme-
diate revocation. Such solutions are impractical either
since whenever the proxy signer wants to generate a
proxy signature, it must contact the third party (SEM
or AS) which is a bottleneck of these systems.
Proxy re-delegation[19] is a useful property in proxy
signature, when a proxy signer wishes to re-delegate a
subset of their signing rights to other users. For exam-
ple, in the applications of on-demand service or soft-
ware manufacturing, the software or service provider
can delegate the right to sell the service or software to
country-wide proxies who can then further delegate the
right to lower-level proxies.
In a re-delegable proxy signature, the proxy signer
can be further classified into the mediate proxy signer
(re-delegator) and the end-node proxy signer (delega-
tee). A mediate proxy signer is able to generate proxy
signing keys for other proxy signers, while an end-node
proxy signer does not generate proxy signing keys for
the others. The list of signers from the original signer
to the delegatee is called a delegation chain.
1.3 Our Result
In this paper, we introduce a novel revocable and
re-delegable proxy signature scheme. Compared with
the previous related work, our scheme has the follow-
ing advantages.
• Our scheme is more practical than the previous
solutions since our scheme does not need any third
party and provides both proxy revocation and proxy
re-delegation. Also, the verifier does not need to obtain
the revocation list to verify a proxy signature. Instead,
it only needs to know the current revocation epoch to
verify a proxy signature.
• Our scheme achieves efficient revocation. The
original signer can revoke a set of proxy signers in each
revocation epoch. A non-revoked proxy signer only
needs to generate once in each revocation epoch a proof
which shows its validity.
• Our scheme explicitly includes the revocation
epoch in signature verification. Hence, the verifier only
rejects the signatures generated by a proxy signer af-
ter its proxy signing right is revoked. The signatures
generated before revocation will remain valid.
As an application of our proxy signature scheme,
we present a secure vehicle hiring protocol that al-
lows end users to safely book vehicles that are autho-
rized by a trusted authority or its legitimate proxies.
Some companies, for example, Uber, Grab, and Lyft,
provide applications in mobile devices that allow cus-
tomers to book vehicles online. There are some exist-
ing studies[20-23] addressing the revocation or delega-
tion problem in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).
However, there is no existing solution addressing both
problems. In this work, we introduce a solution to ad-
dress both problems and also the concept and technique
for allowing re-delegation that makes our solution more
scalable and practical.
1.4 Differences with [24]
An extended abstract of this paper appears in the
Proceeding of ACISP 2016[24], where we introduced a
hierarchical revocation scheme and a proxy signature
scheme with efficient revocation. In this paper, we ex-
tend the original proxy signature to achieve both revo-
cation and re-delegation. To realize this goal, we extend
and modify the models and the scheme in [24].
We extend the original scheme to realize revocable
and re-delegable proxy signature Γ = (Setup, KeyGen,
Delegation, Revocation, Sign, Verify). In Γ.Delegation,
we append some extra information to determine the
relationship between the delegator and the delega-
tee, which allows the delegatee to gain a delegation
chain to prove the validity of the signer. Similarly,
in Γ.Revocation, we allow every mediator proxy signer
to generate a revocation list to revoke its delegatee(s).
Γ.Sign and Γ.Verify are also modified to handle the del-
egation chain compared to the original revocable proxy
signature scheme.
We also modify the security models in the original
paper[24] to define stronger security. In each model, we
define a new oracle called corrupt oracle, which allows
the adversary to corrupt the original, mediate signers
to obtain their secret keys. Due to the modification of
the security models and the extra requirement of proxy
re-delegation, we also rewrite the security proofs.
1.5 Outline of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some
preliminaries are presented in Section 2. The formal
definition and security models for our scheme are de-
scribed in Section 3. The proposed proxy signature
scheme and its security proof are given in Section 4.
We then present a secure vehicle ordering system as an
application of our proposed scheme in Section 5. Fi-
nally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will briefly review some basic
backgrounds used in this paper, including pairings,
complexity assumptions, and some other schemes to
construct our revocable and re-delegable proxy signa-
ture.
2.1 Bilinear Map
Let G and GT denote two cyclic multiplicative
groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G.
The map e : G × G → GT is said to be an admissible
bilinear map if the following properties hold.
1) Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp,
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2) Non-degeneration: e(g, g) 6= 1.
3) Computability: it is efficient to compute e(u, v)
for any u, v ∈ G.
We say that (G,GT ) are bilinear groups if there ex-
ists a bilinear map e : G×G → GT as above.
2.2 Complexity Assumptions
Our scheme relies on the classical computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, whose details are de-
scribed as follows.
Definition 1 (CDH Problem). Let G be a group
with a generator g. The computational Diffie-Hellman
problem is as follows: given (g, ga, gb), for random
a, b ∈ Z∗p, then compute g
ab. We say algorithm A has
advantage ǫ in solving this problem if
AdvcdhA (λ) = Pr(g
ab ← A(g, ga, gb) : a, b
R
←− Z∗p) > ǫ.
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). We say it satis-
fies the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption if for
any polynomial-time algorithm, the advantage in solv-
ing the CDH problem is negligible.
2.3 Revocation Mechanism
Naor et al.[25] introduced a subset cover framework
for broadcast encryption. This framework is based on
the complete subtree (CS) method and the subset diffe-
rence (SD) method. Halevy and Shamir[26] proposed a
new method called layered subset difference (LSD) to
improve the key distribution in the SD method. Later,
Dodis and Fazio[27] pointed out that HIBE schemes can
be based on the above methods. In this subsection, we
will briefly introduce the SD method.
The SD method as shown in Fig.1 works like a white
list and we call it a revocation list in this paper. Each
user is assigned to a leaf node in the tree and given
the private keys of all co-path nodes from the root to
the leaf. Let N denote all the users and R the revoked
users. This method will group the valid users (N \ R)
into m sets Sk1,u1 , ..., Skm,um . Each valid user belongs
to at least one set, and the number of sets m satisfies
m 6 2|R|− 1. Let Txj denote the subtree rooted at xj .
Subset Ski,ui is defined as follows. Tki is called the
primitive root. Tui is called the secondary root, and
Tui is a descendant of Tki . The valid users in the set
Ski,ui consists of the leaves of Tki that are not in Tui .
Thus, each user may belong to more than one set.
2.4 Digital Signature Scheme
A digital signature scheme[28] is a triple of proba-
bilistic polynominal time (PPT) algorithms Σ =
(KeyGen, Sign, Verify).
• Σ.KeyGen(1λ) → (pk, sk). It inputs a security
parameter λ and outputs in PPT a pair (pk, sk) of
matching the public and secret key.
• Σ.Signsk(m) → σ. It produces a signature σ for a
message m using the secret key sk.
• Σ.Verifypk(m,σ) → [0, 1]. It tests whether σ is a
valid signature for message m using the public key pk.
Tk
Tk
Tk Tk
Tu Tu
Tu
Tu Valid Proxy Signer or Inner Node
Revoked Proxy Signer
..
.
..
.
(a) (b)
??? ???
Fig.1. SD method. (a) All revoked proxy signers under a subtree. (b) Revoked proxy signer under different subtrees.
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The algorithm outputs either 1 (valid) or 0 (invalid).
2.5 Security Model for Existential
Unforgeability
We assume the digital signature scheme σ is exis-
tential unforgeability under a chosen-message attack.
Thus, given public key pk, the adversary cannot forge
any message without knowing the secret key sk. There-
fore, the hard problem is given pk, the adversary can-
not forge any message under this public key. Existential
unforgeability[29] under an adaptive chosen-message at-
tack is defined using the following game.
• Setup. The challenger runs Σ.KeyGen. It gives
the adversary the resulting public key pk and keeps the
private key sk to itself.
• Signing Query (OEUS ). The adversary issues sign-
ing queriesm1, ...,mq. To each querymi, the challenger
responds by running Σ.Sign to generate a signature si
of mi and sending si to the adversary. These queries
may be asked adaptively so that each querymi may de-
pend on the replies to m1, ...,mi−1. A database DEUS
to record the message has been signed.
• Output. Finally the adversary outputs a pair
(m∗, s∗). The adversary wins if s∗ is a valid signature
of m∗ according to Σ.Verify and m∗ is not among the
pairs mi generated during the query phase.
Definition 3. A signature scheme is (t, q, ǫ) exis-
tentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message
attack if no t-time adversary AEU making at most
q signing queries has advantage at least ǫ in the
above game. For any PPT adversary AEU involved
in the experiment in Fig.2, we have Adveu-cmaAEU (λ) =
Pr(Expeu-cmaAEU (λ) = 1) ∈ negl(λ), where negl(λ) denotes
the set of negligible functions.
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∆.KeyGen(pko, sko, pki, wi, id) → did: given a pub-
lic key pko and a secret key sko of the original signer
O, a proxy signer Pi’s public key pki, a warrant wi
and a label value id in the hierarchy, it outputs a hier-
archical private key did, where the private key did in-
cludes the decryption key (D1, D2) and the delegation
key (K2, ..., Kℓ−|id|+1).
did = (D1, D2, K2, ..., Kℓ−|id|+1),
D1 = H1(id, wi, pki)
sko × (h0 × h
H(id)
1 )
r,
D2 = g
r,
K2, ..., Kℓ−|id|+1 = h
r
2, ..., h
r
ℓ−|id|+1.
∆.Derive(pko, id, did, id
′) → did′ : given a public
key pko of the original signer O, a label value id and
its hierarchical private key did and a label value id
′,
where id′ is a descendant of id in the hierarchy, i.e.,
id′ = id‖I1, ..., Id, it outputs another hierarchical pri-
vate key did′ for id
′ 2○.
did′ = (D
′
1, D
′
2),
D′1 = D1 ×
d∏
i=1
K
H(Ii)
i+1 ,
D′2 = D2.
∆.Encode(id, id′) → C: given a label value id and
another label value id′ which is a descendant of id, it
outputs an encoding value C.
C = h0 × h
H(id)
1 × h
H(I1)
2 × · · · × h
H(Id)
d+1 .
∆.Verify(pko, pki, wi, id, C, did′) → [0, 1]: given a
public key pko of the original signer O, a proxy signer
Pi’s public key pki and its warrant wi, a label value id,
an encoding value C (with regard to id and id′) and a
hierarchical private key did′ , it outputs 1 (valid) if the
following equation holds.
e(g,D′1) = e(pko,H1(id, wi, pki))× e(C,D
′
2).
Otherwise, it returns 0.
This scheme has been proven to be key robust in the
random oracle model[24] assuming the CDH assumption
is hard. The details of the security model are described
below.
Security Model for Hierarchical Revocation Algo-
rithm. The security model for hierarchical revocation
algorithm is called key robustness. The security model
is defined using the following game.
Setup. The challenger runs setup. It gives the ad-
versary the resulting of master public key mpk and
keeps the master private key msk to itself.
Keygen Query (OAG ). The adversary issues up to
qG key generations queries {(idi, wi, pki)}
qG
i=1. To each
(idi, wi, pki), the challenger responds by running Key-
gen to generate a result didi for (idi, wi, pki) and send-
ing didi to the adversary. These queries may be asked
adaptively so that each query (idi, wi, pki) may depend
on the replies to (id1, w1, pk1), ..., (idi−1, wi−1, pki−1).
A database DAG records all the messages that have
been queried.
Output. Finally the adversary outputs (id∗, id∗′, w∗,
C∗, pk∗, d∗id∗′) such that C
∗ is an encoding with regard
to id∗ and id∗′. The adversary wins if (id∗′, w∗, pk∗) or
(prefix(id∗′), w∗, pk∗) has not appeared in any Kengen
queries, and (mpk,w∗, pk∗, id∗, C∗, d∗id∗′) can pass the
verification.
In the random oracle model, we have an additional
oracle called hash oracle.
Hash Query (OAH). The adversary issues hash
queries {(idi, wi, pki)}
qH
i=1. To each (idi, wi, pki), the
challenger responds by returning a random element in
the range of the hash function H1. The same result is
returned if the same input is queried for more than one
time.
Definition 4. A hierarchical revocation scheme is
(t, qH , qG, ǫ) key robust if no t-time adversary A making
at most qH hash queries and qG keygen queries has ad-
vantage at least ǫ in the above game. For any PPT ad-
versary A involved in the experiment in Fig.3, we have
Adv
key-robust
A (λ) = Pr(Exp
key-robust
A (λ, ℓ) = 1) ∈ negl(λ).
3 Formal Definitions and Security Models
In this section, we will demonstrate the syntax of
our revocable and re-delegable proxy signature scheme
and its formal security models. Here, we provide the
details of some notations, and they will be used in this
section.
• N is the set of the proxy signers, and |N | is the
number of the proxy signers.
• R is the set of the revoked proxy signers, and |R|
is the number of the revoked proxy signers.
• Rt is the set of the revoked proxy signers under
the revocation epoch t.
• ℓ ∈ Z is the maximum level of the tree and
|N | = 2ℓ.
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the public key of the original signer pko, public keys of
all proxy signers {pki}
|N |
i=1, and a corrupt oracle to cor-
rupt any proxy signer and some mediate proxy signers
including the original signer. The goal of adversary is to
forge a valid proxy signature after it has been revoked.
One can find that if our revocable and re-delegable
scheme is secure against type II (or type III or type
IV) adversary, our scheme is also secure against type I
adversary. Below we give the formal security models.
In all the security models, we assume that there is only
one set of revoked signers Rti for each revocation epoch
ti.
1) Security Model for Adversary AII. AII repre-
sents the original signer or any mediate proxy signer
who wants to generate a valid proxy signature for any
proxy signer without knowing its secret key. The secu-
rity model is defined using the following game.
Setup. The challenger generates |N |+ 1 public and
secret key pairs and assigns them to the original signer
and proxy signers. Then it gives the adversary the pub-
lic parameter pp, and the public keys of the original
signer pko and proxy signers {pki}
|N |
i=1.
Corrupt Query (OIIC). The adversary issues up to
qC corrupt queries. Upon receiving a public key pk cor-
responding to any mediate proxy signer including the
original signer or some proxy signers, the challenger re-
veals the matching secret key sk of the public key pk.
These queries may be asked adaptively so that each
query may depend on the replies to all previous queries.
A database DIIC records all the queried messages.
Signing Query (OIIS). The adversary issues up
to qS signing queries (w, pk,M, t, {pki,Rt}i∈m), where
pk 6∈ Rt. The challenger responds by running
T ← Γ.Delegation(pki, pkai , skai , wi, Tai) to obtain the
delegated tag T , the revocation algorithm RL ←
Γ. Revocation(pkai, skai , t,Rt) to gain the revocation
list RLt for all proxy mediators, and σ ← Γ.Sign
(sk, T,RLt,M) to obtain the proxy signature σ. After
that, the challenger sends σ to the adversary. These
queries may be asked adaptively so that each query
may depend on the replies to all previous queries. A
database DIIS records all the information of queries.
Output. Finally, the adversary outputs (w∗, pk∗,
M∗, t∗, {pk∗i , Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). The adversary wins if pk∗
has not been corrupted, (pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m)
does not appear in DIIS , and (pk
∗, pko, t
∗,M∗, σ∗) can
pass the verification.
Definition 5. A proxy signature scheme is
(t, qC , qS , ǫ) existentially unforgeable under type II
adaptive chosen-message attacks if no t-time adversary
AII making at most qC corrupt queries and qS sign-
ing queries has advantage at least ǫ in the above game.
For any PPT adversary AII involved in the experiment
in Fig.4, we have Adveu-cmaAII (λ) = Pr(Exp
eu-cma
AII (λ, ℓ) =
1) ∈ negl(λ).
2) Security Model for Adversary AIII. AIII stands
for a malicious proxy signer, who wants to generate
a proxy signature without knowing at least one of all
the delegated tags of its proxy mediators. The security
model is defined using the following game.
Setup. The challenger generates |N |+ 1 public key
and secret key pairs and assigns them to the original
signer and proxy signers. Then it gives the adversary
the public parameter pp, and the public keys of the
original signer pko and proxy signers {pki}
|N |
i=1.
Corrupt Query (OIIIC). The adversary issues up to
qC corrupt queries. Upon receiving a public key pk
corresponding to any end-node proxy signer or some
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mediate proxy signers including the original signer, the
challenger responses the related secret key sk. These
queries may be asked adaptively so that each query
may depend on the replies to all previous queries. A
database DIIIC records all the queried messages.
Delegation Query (OIIID). The adversary issues up
to qD delegation queries. To each delegation query (pk,
pka, w), the challenger responds by running the algo-
rithm T ← Γ.Delegation(pk, pka, ska, wi, Ta) to gain the
delegated tag T and the challenger sends T to the ad-
versary. These queries may be asked adaptively. A
database DIIID records all the delegation queries.
Revocation Query (OIIIR). The adversary issues up
to qR revocation queries (pk, t,Rt). To each query, the
challenger responds by executing RL ← Γ.Revocation
(pk, sk, t,Rt) to acquire the revocation list RLt for re-
vocation epoch t. Then the challenger sends RLt to
the adversary. These queries may be asked adaptively.
Notice that we assume there is only one (pk,Rt) pair
for each t.
Signing Query (OIIIS). The adversary makes up to
qS signing queries to the challenger. For each (w, pk,M,
t, {pki,Rt}i∈m) where pk 6∈ Rt, the challenger responds
by running the delegation T ← Γ. Delegation(pki, pkai ,
skai , wi, Tai) algorithm to get delegated tag T , the revo-
cation algorithm RL ← Γ. Revocation(pkai, skai , t,Rt)
to obtain the revocation list RLt for all proxy mediators
{pki}i∈m, and σ ← Γ.Sign(sk, T,RLt,M) algorithm to
get the proxy signature σ. After that, the challenger
sends σ to the adversary. These queries may be asked
adaptively so that each query may depend on the replies
to all previous queries. A database DIIIS records all the
information of queries.
Output. Finally, the adversary outputs (w∗, pk∗,
M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). The adversary wins if the
immediate proxy ancestor pk∗a has not been corrupted,
(pk∗, pk∗a , w
∗) has not been queried to delegation ora-
cle, (pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m) has not been queried
to signing oracle, and (pk∗, pko, t
∗,M∗, σ∗) can pass
verification.
Definition 6. A proxy signature scheme is
(t, qC , qD, qR, qS , ǫ) existentially unforgeable under type
III adaptive chosen-message attacks if no t-time adver-
sary AIII making at most qC corrupt queries, qD del-
egation queries, qR revocation queries and qS signing
queries has advantage at least ǫ in the above game. For
any PPT adversary AIII involved in the experiment in
Fig.5, we have Adveu-cmaAIII (λ) = Pr(Exp
eu-cma
AIII (λ) = 1) ∈
negl(λ).
3) Security Model for Adversary AIV. AIV repre-
sents revoked proxy signers who want to generate a
valid proxy signature. The security model is defined
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using the following game.
Setup. The challenger generates |N |+ 1 public key
and secret key pairs and assigns them to the original
signer and proxy signers. Then it gives the adversary
the system parameter pp and the public keys of the
original signer pko and proxy signers {pki}
|N |
i=1.
Corrupt Query (OIVC). The adversary issues up to
qC corrupt queries. Upon receiving a public key pk cor-
responding to any end-node proxy signer or some medi-
ate proxy signer including the original signer, the chal-
lenger reveals the related secret key sk. These queries
may be asked adaptively so that each query may de-
pend on the replies to all previous queries. A database
DIVC records all the queried messages.
Delegation Query (OIVD). The adversary issues up
to qD delegation queries. To each delegation query (pk,
pka, w), the challenger responds by running the algo-
rithm T ← Γ.Delegation(pk, pka, ska, wi, Ta) to gain the
delegated tag T and the challenger sends T to the ad-
versary. These queries may be asked adaptively.
Revocation Query (OIVR). The adversary issues up
to qR revocation queries (pk, t,Rt). To each query, the
challenger responds by executing the revocation algo-
rithm RL ←Revocation(pk, t,Rt) to acquire the revo-
cation list RLt for revocation epoch t. Then the chal-
lenger sends RLt to the adversary. These queries may
be asked adaptively. Notice that we assume there is
only one (pk,Rt) pair for each t.
Signing Query (OIVS). The adversary sends up to
qS signing queries to the challenger. For each (w, pk,M,
t, {pki,Rt}i∈m) where pk 6∈ Rt, the challenger responds
by running the delegation algorithm T ← Γ.Delegation
(pki, pkai , skai , wi, Tai) to get delegated tag T , RL ←
Γ.Revocation(pkai , skai , t,Rt) to gain revocation list
RLt for all proxy mediators {pki}i∈m, and the sign-
ing algorithm σ ← Γ.Sign (sk, T,RLt,M) to get the
proxy signature σ. After that, the challenger sends σ
to the adversary. These queries may be asked adap-
tively so that each query may depend on the replies to
all previous queries. A database DIVS records all the
information of queries.
Output. Finally, the adversary outputs (w∗, pk∗,
M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). The adversary wins if (pk∗,
pko, t
∗, M∗, σ∗) can pass the verification, pk∗ is in the
revoked signer set Rt∗ , and its immediate proxy ances-
tor pk∗a and delegation query (pk
∗, pk∗a , w
∗) have not
been corrupted and queried to delegation oracle.
Definition 7. A proxy signature scheme is (t, qC ,
qD, qR, qS, ǫ)-strongly existentially unforgeable under
type IV adaptive chosen-message attacks if no t-time
adversary AIV making at most qC corrupt queries, qD
delegation queries, qR revocation queries and qS signing
queries has advantage at least ǫ in the above game. For
any PPT adversary AIV involved in the experiment in
Fig.6, we have Adveu-cmaAIV (λ) = Pr(Exp
eu-cma
AIV (λ) = 1) ∈
negl(λ).
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4 Proposed Scheme
In this section, inspired by the hierarchical revo-
cation scheme[24], we construct a revocable and re-
delegable proxy signature scheme. The idea of our
scheme is that all the proxy signers can delegate their
signing rights to other proxy signers by creating a new
tree structure revocation list. A proxy signer needs to
prove that all of its ancestral proxy signers and itself
are unrevoked. Our revocable and re-delegable proxy
signature has six PPT algorithms.
Γ.Setup(1λ, 1ℓ) → (pp, pko, sko). The original
signer O sets up the system by running ∆.Setup:
(pp, pko, sko) ← ∆.Setup(1
λ, 1ℓ),
where the public and secret key pair (pko, sko) is gene-
rated by executing Σ.KeyGen.
The public parameter pp is:
pp = (e,G,GT , g, p, {hi}
ℓ
i=0,H,H1).
Γ.KeyGen(1λ) → (pki, ski). The proxy
signer Pi generates key pair (pki, ski) by running
∆.ProxyKeyGen:
(pki, ski) ← ∆.ProxyKeyGen(1
λ),
where the public and secret key pair (pki, ski) is derived
from Σ.KeyGen.
Γ.Delegation(pki, pkai, skai, wi, Tai) → Ti. The
mediate proxy signer Pai (or the original signer O)
generates the delegated tag Ti for its immediate de-
scendant proxy signer Pi.
• A warrant wi is an explicit description of the del-
egation relation.
• Tai is the delegated tag for the proxy signer Pai
or the original signer O (To = ∅).
• Pai assigns to Pi an available leaf vi of label 〈vi〉.
Let x0 = ǫ, x1, ..., xℓ−1, xℓ = vi be the path from the
root ǫ of T to vi. For j = 0 to ℓ, Pai does the follow-
ings:
1) consider the sub-tree Txj rooted at node xj , and
let copathxj be the co-path from xj to vi;
2) for each node ω ∈ copathxj , since xj is an an-
cestor of ω, 〈xj〉 is a prefix of 〈ω〉 and we denote by
〈ω〉 = 〈xj〉‖ωℓ1...ωℓ2 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}ℓ2−ℓ1+1, for some
ℓ1 6 ℓ2 6 ℓ, the suffix of 〈ω〉 coming right after 〈xj〉.
Compute the hierarchical private key dw by running
∆.KeyGen:
dw ← ∆.KeyGen(pkai , skai , pki, wi, 〈xj〉).
Parse dw = (Dω,1, Dω,2, Kω,ℓ2−ℓ1+3, ..., Kω,ℓ). Set
hω = H1(xj , ωi, pki)
skai , elements Dω,1, Dω,2 and
Kω,ℓ2−ℓ1+3, ..., Kω,ℓ are:
Dω,1 = hω × (h0 × h
H(〈xj〉)
1 × h
H(〈ωℓ1〉)
2 × · · · ×
h
H(〈ωℓ2〉)
ℓ2−ℓ1+2
)r,
Dω,2 = g
r,
Kω,ℓ2−ℓ1+3, ..., Kω,ℓ = h
r
ℓ2−ℓ1+3, ..., h
r
ℓ .
• Pi gains the delegated tag Ti:
Ti ← Tai ∪ (pkai , pki, wi, 〈vi〉, {{dω}ω∈copathxj }
ℓ
j=0).
Γ.Revocation(pkai , skai, t,Rt) → RLt. The me-
diate proxy signer Pai generates the revocation list for
its own immediate descendant proxy signers.
• Using the subset difference covering algorithm[25],
we find a cover of unrevoked user set N \ Rt as the
union of disjoint subsets of the form set
{Sk1,u1 , ..., Skm,um}
with m 6 2× |R| − 1.
• For i = 1 to m, we do the followings.
1) Consider Ski,ui as the difference between sub-
trees rooted at an internal node xki and one of its de-
scendants xui . The label of 〈xui 〉 can be written as:
〈xui 〉 = 〈xki〉‖ui,ℓi,1 ...ui,ℓi,2 .
2) Compute an encoding value Ci of Ski,ui as a
group element by running ∆.Encode:
Ci ← ∆.Encode(〈xki 〉, 〈xui 〉).
Parse Ci = h0×h
H(〈xki〉)
1 ×h
H(ui,ℓi,1)
2 ×· · ·×h
H(ui,ℓi,2)
ℓi,2−ℓi,1+2
.
3) The proxy ancestor Pai (or the original signer O)
generates a signature Θi:
Θi ← Σ.Signskai (Ci, g
t).
• Return the revocation list RLt:
RLt = (pkai , t,Rt, {〈xki〉, 〈xui〉, (Ci,Θi)}
m
i=1) .
Γ.Sign(ski, Ti,RLt,M) → σ. The proxy signer
Pi generates a proxy signature σ for a message M . Pi
only needs to generate the hierarchical decryption key
once for the whole delegation chain in each revocation
epoch.
• Suppose the delegated tag Ti = {T1, T2, ..., Tn}.
For k = 1 to n, we generate the proof that shows Tk is
a valid delegated tag.
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1) Parse the delegated tag Tk:
Tk = (pk
′
ai
, pk′i, w
′
i, 〈vi〉, {{dω}ω∈copathxj }
ℓ
j=0).
2) Parse the revocation list RL:
RL = (pk′′ai , t,Rt, {〈xki〉, 〈xui 〉, (Ci,Θi)}
m
i=1).
3) Set Ω = ∅, find the revocation list RL ∈ RLt
where pk′ai in Tk is equal to pk
′′
ai
in the revocation list
RL and then do the followings.
a) Determine set Skl,ul , with l ∈ {1, ..., m} that
contains the leaf vi (this subset must exist since
pk′i 6∈ Rt) and let xkl and xul denote the pri-
mary and the secondary roots of Skl,ul , respec-
tively. Since xkl is an ancestor of xul , we can
write 〈xul〉:
〈xul〉 = 〈xkl 〉‖ul,ℓ1...ul,ℓ2 ,
for some ℓ1 < ℓ2 < ℓ and with ul,κ ∈ {0, 1} for
each κ ∈ {ℓ1, ..., ℓ2}.
b) The proxy signer Pi computes a hierarchical de-
cryption key d〈xul 〉 for the next immediate medi-
ate node of Pai :
d〈xul 〉 ← ∆.Derive(pk
′
ai
, 〈xkl 〉, dxkl , 〈xul〉).
Parse d〈xul 〉 = (Dl,1, Dl,2). Set hℓ = H1(xkl ,
wi, pki)
skai . Elements Dl,1 and Dl,2 are:
Dl,1 = hℓ(h0 × h
H(〈xkl 〉)
1 h
H(ul,ℓ1)
2 × · · · ×
h
H(ul,ℓ2)
ℓ2−ℓ1+2
)r,
Dl,2 = g
r.
c) Set Ωk = (pk
′
ai
, pk′i, w
′
i, xkl , xul , Dl,1, Dl,2, Cl,Θl)
and Ω ← Ω ∪ Ωk.
• Compute σM ← Σ.Signski(M,Ω).
• Return the proxy signature σ = (Ω, σM ).
Γ.Verify(pki, pko, t,M,σ) → [0, 1]. The verifier
checks the proxy signature.
• Check σM : if Σ.Verifypki((M,Ω), σM ) → 0, return
0.
• Parse Ω = {Ω1, ...,Ωn}. For j = 1 to n, check the
message in Ωj .
1) Parse the proof of delegation chain Ωj =
(pk′ai , pk
′
i, w
′
i, 〈xkl〉, 〈xul〉, Dl,1, Dl,2, Cl,Θl).
2) Check Θl: if Σ.Verifypk′ai
((Cl, g
t),Θl) → 0, return
0.
3) Check Cl: if ∆.Verify(pk
′
ai
, pk′i, w
′
i, 〈xul 〉, Cl,
d〈xul 〉) → 0, return 0.
• Otherwise, return 1.
4.1 Efficiency Analysis
Since our revocable and re-delegable proxy signa-
ture is based on the subset difference (SD) revocation
method[24-25], the size of a delegated tag is O(log2 N )
and the size of the revocation list is O(R), where N
is the number of system users and R is the number of
revoked users.
The cost of signing is constant, and it signs the mes-
sageM and a set of signatures Ω for all proxy signers in
the delegation chain, where the set of signatures Ω only
needs to be generated once in every revocation epoch.
The cost of verification is linear in the number of proxy
signers in the delegation chain. In reality, the delega-
tion chain usually has a constant size. Therefore, our
verification algorithm is efficient in practice.
4.2 Security Analysis for Adversary AII
Theorem 1. Our revocable and re-delegable proxy
signature is (t, qC , qS , ǫ)-secure against the adversary
AII, assuming the signature scheme σ is (t′, q′, ǫ′)-
secure existentially unforgeable under an adaptive
chosen-message attack, where ǫ′ = 1/|N | × ǫ.
Proof. Suppose AII is a forger that can break the
scheme. There then exists a PPT algorithm B that
can break the existential unforgeability of the signa-
ture scheme used by the proxy signer. Let C denote the
challenger of B.
• Setup. Algorithm B receives the challenge public
key pk from C and sets the parameters as follows.
1) Generate the system parameters (pp, pko, sko).
2) Choose an uniformly random number k from the
distribution {1, ..., |N |}, and then set pkk = pk.
3) Select |N |−1 random numbers {xi}
|N |
i=1,i6=k ∈ Zp,
the set ski = xi and pki = g
xi for i = 1, ..., |N | and
i 6= k.
4) Return (pp, pko, {pki}
|N |
i=1) to AII.
• QIIC . Adversary AII issues up to qC corrupt
queries. Algorithm B responds to a query on message
pki as follows.
1) If i 6= k, it finds the secret key ski corresponding
to the public key pki.
2) If i = k, it aborts.
3) Return ski to AII.
• QIIS . Adversary AII issues up to qS signing
queries. Algorithm B responds to a query on message
(wi, pki, Mi, ti, {pkj,Rt}j∈m) as follows.
1) If i = k, execute Γ.Delegation to generate the
private tag Ti, Γ.Revocation to gain the revocation list
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RLti , query Ω to the algorithm C to obtain σMi , and
then set the proxy signature σi = (Ω, σMi).
2) If i 6= k and k 6∈ m, the processes are the same
as the above case except that signature σM is obtained
from Γ.Sign algorithm.
3) If i 6= k and k ∈ m, the processes are the same as
the above case except that the delegation tag for Pk’s
delegatee is obtained from algorithm C.
4) Return σi to AII.
• Output. Finally adversary AII outputs a forgery
(w∗, pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i , Rt∗}i∈mediator, σ
∗). It aborts if
pk∗ 6= pkk. Parse the proxy signature σ∗ = (Ω∗, σM∗).
Algorithm B sends (M∗, Ω∗) as the message and σM∗
as the forged signature to algorithm C. Therefore algo-
rithm B can break the existential unforgeability of the
underlying signature scheme.
Adversary AII guessing k successfully is 1/|N |.
Therefore, algorithm B that can break the existential
unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme with
the advantage ǫ′ is:
ǫ′ =
1
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querying public key pki is the target public key pkk,
the algorithm B will query algorithm C to answer the
signing query.
• Output. Finally adversary AIII1 outputs a forgery
(w∗, pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i , Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). If pk∗ 6= pkk, it
aborts. Parse σ∗ = (Ω∗, σM∗) and Ω
∗
i = (id
∗, id∗′,
w∗, D∗1 , D
∗
2 , C
∗,Θ∗), where Ω∗i ∈ Ω
∗ and the signing
key of Ω∗i has not been corrupted. Algorithm B sends
(C∗, gt
∗
) as the message and Θ∗ as the forged signa-
ture to C. Thus algorithm B can break the existential
unforgeability of the signature scheme.
The probability analysis is the same as the one in
type II adversary. Adversary AIII1 guessing k success-
fully is 1/|N |. Hence, algorithm B which can break the
signature scheme with the advantage ǫ′ is:
ǫ′ =
1
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1) Generate the system parameters pp.
2) Choose a uniformly random number k from the
distribution {1, ..., |N |} ∪ {o}, and then set pkk = pk.
3) Select |N | random numbers {xi}
|N |
i=1 ∈ Zp, the set
ski = xi and pki = g
xi for i = 1, ..., |N | and i 6= k. If
k = o, set the public key of original signer pko = pk.
4) Return (pp, pko, {pki}
|N |
i=1) to AIV1.
• QIVC1. Adversary AVI1 issues up to qC corrupt
queries. Algorithm B responds to a query on message
pki as follows.
1) If i 6= k, it finds the secret key ski corresponding
to the public key pki.
2) If i = k, it aborts.
3) Return ski to AIV1.
• QIVD1. AdversaryAIV1 issues up to qD delegation
queries. Algorithm B responds to a query on message
(pki, pkai , wi) as follows.
1) Assign an available label 〈vi〉 to pki.
2) Select a random number r.
3) Define the co-path identity {{idx}x∈copathxj }
ℓ
j=0.
For each identity, algorithm B does the followings.
a) Algorithm B simulates a signature sx for
(idx, wi, pki) by programming the random oracle
H1. If the proxy ancestor’s public key pkai is the
target public key pkk, the signature sx is obtained
from algorithm C by querying (idx, wi, pki).
b) Algorithm B then uses sx to compute dx as usual.
4) Set the delegated tag and send it to adversary
AIV1.
Ti = (pkai , pki, wi, 〈vi〉, {{dx}x∈copathxj }
ℓ
j=0).
• QIVR1. B uses its signing oracle to answer the re-
vocation queries. If the querying message includes the
target public key pkk, B uses its signing oracle to answer
the revocation after querying (Ci, g
t) to the algorithm
C.
• QIVS1. Adversary AIV1 issues at most qS sign-
ing queries. Algorithm B responds to a query (wi, pki,
Mi, ti, {pkj,Rt}j∈m) as follows.
1) If (pki, pkai , wi) has not been queried, simulate a
delegation query to gain delegation tag Ti. If the proxy
ancestor’s public key pkai is the target public key pkk,
it queries the algorithm C to obtain the signature and
then simulate the delegation tag Ti.
2) If (ti, {pkj ,Rt}j∈m) has not been queried, sim-
ulate a revocation query to get RLti . If the target
public key is one of the members in delegation chain
(k ∈ {m}), the algorithm B simulates the revocation
list RLti by querying the signature to the algorithm C.
3) Run the ∆.Sign algorithm using the secret key of
the proxy signer to generate the proxy signature. If the
querying public key pki is the target public key pkk, the
algorithm B will query the algorithm C to answer the
signing query.
• Output. Finally adversary AIV1 outputs a forgery
(w∗, pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). If pk∗ 6= pkk, it
aborts. Parse σ∗ = (Ω∗, σM∗) and Ω
∗
i = (id
∗, id∗′,
w∗, D∗1 , D
∗
2 , C
∗,Θ∗), where Ω∗i ∈ Ω
∗ and the signing
key of Ω∗i has not been corrupted. Algorithm B sends
(C∗, gt
∗
) as the message and Θ∗ as the forged signature
to C. Thus the algorithm B can break the existential
unforgeability of the signature scheme.
The probability analysis is the same as the one in
type II adversary. Adversary AIV1 guessing k success-
fully is 1/|N |. Hence, algorithm B that can break the
signature scheme with the advantage ǫ′ is:
ǫ′ =
1
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algorithm C will return the delegation tag Ti instead of
the signature sx.
• QIVR2. Adversary AIV2 issues up to qR delega-
tion queries. The process of algorithm B responding to
a query (ti, (pkj ,Rti)) is the same as QIVR1 except that
algorithm C will return the revocation list RLti under
the time epoch ti instead of the signature sx.
• QIVS2. Adversary AIV2 issues at most qS sign-
ing queries. Algorithm B responds to a query (wi, pki,
Mi, ti, {pkj, Rt}j∈mediator) as QIVS1 except that algo-
rithm C will return the delegation tag in delegation
phase and the revocation list in revocation phase when
one of proxy mediators is the target signer (k ∈ m).
• Output. Finally adversary AIV2 outputs a forgery
(w∗, pk∗,M∗, t∗, {pk∗i ,Rt∗}i∈m, σ
∗). If pk∗a 6= pkk, it
aborts. Parse σ∗ = (Ω∗, σ∗M ) and Ω
∗
i = (id
∗, id∗′, w∗,
D∗1 , D
∗
2 , C
∗,Θ∗), where Ω∗i ∈ Ω
∗ and the signing key
of Ω∗i has not been queried. Since (w
∗, pk∗) has not
appeared in any delegation query, algorithm B returns
(id∗, id∗′, w∗, C∗, pk∗, D∗1 , D
∗
2 , ) and breaks the key ro-
bustness of the hierarchical revocation scheme.
Adversary AIV2 guessing k successfully is 1/|N |.
Hence, the algorithm B that can break the key robust-
ness of the hierarchical revocation scheme with the ad-
vantage ǫ′ is:
ǫ′ =
1
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2) The transportation network agent, which has re-
ceived the delegation from the transportation network
company or another upper-level agent, provides the del-
egation to other agents and vehicles. The agent can be
further classified into two types.
a) Type-A agent has the delegation right to other
agents and vehicles.
b) Type-B agent only can delegate vehicles.
3) The vehicle obtains the delegation from the trans-
portation network company or from an agent. The re-
sponsibility of vehicles is offering the service to cus-
tomers. Since the vehicles are registered and authorized
by the company or its agent, the safety of the customer
will be ensured.
4) The transportation network company maintains a
server which offers a communication platform between
customers and vehicles.
5) A customer can order the vehicles through the
system: the customer sends a request with the require-
ments on the vehicle to the server and the server broad-
casts the information to all the vehicles. In order to
take the order, a vehicle generates a response that will
be sent to the user.
5.1 Security Requirements of RRVOS
The following five properties should be achieved si-
multaneously by a secure RRVOS.
Authorization. Only authorized vehicles that have
obtained the delegation from the company or an autho-
rized agent can successfully take an order.
Revocation. The company and the agent are able to
revoke the signing ability they have delegated.
Mutual Authentication. The customer and the ve-
hicle are sure about the identity of each other.
Message Integrity. The integrity and authenticity
of the messages communicated between the vehicle and
the customer should be preserved.
Non-Repudiation. Anyone cannot deny the message
(i.e., a request from the customer or a response from
the vehicle) it has sent.
5.2 RRVOS Protocol
In this subsection, we present a secure RRVOS
based on our new proxy signature scheme. In Table 1,
we summarize the notations used in the protocol de-
scription.
• Setup. Company runs the algorithm Γ.Setup to
generate the system parameters including public para-
meter pp, the public key pko, and the secret key sko
which is used for delegation.
Table 1. Notations
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1) V ehicle111:
(pkV111 , skV111) ← Γ.KeyGen(1
λ).
2) V ehicle111 → Agent11: pkV111 .
3) V ehicle111 ← Agent11:
TV111 ← Γ.Delegation(pkV111 , pkA11 , skA11 , ∅, TA11).
• User Registration. The registration of User1 has
the following three phases. User1 generates the public
key pkU1 and the secret key skU2 and sends the public
key pkU1 to Company who runs Γ.Delegation and sends
the delegation tag TU1 to User1.
1) User1:
(pkU1 , skU1) ← Γ.KeyGen(1
λ).
2) User1 → Server: pkU1 .
3) User1 ← Server:
TU1 ← Γ.Delegation(pkU , pko, sko, ∅, ∅).
• Type-A Agent Revocation. Agent1 is a type-
A agent. The revocation of Agent1 has two phases.
Company adds the public key pkA1 into the revoca-
tion list Rt in the epoch t. Then, Company runs
Γ.Revocation and publishes the new revocation list RL
for revoking Agent1.
1) Company: Rt ← Rt ∪ pkA1 .
2) Company:
RL ← Γ.Revocation(pko, sko, t,Rt).
• Type-B Agent Revocation. Agent11 is a type-
B agent. The revocation of Agent11 has two phases.
Agent1 adds the public key pkA11 into the revocation
list Rt in the epoch t. Then, Agent1 runs Γ.Revocation
and publishes the new revocation list RL for revoking
Agent11.
1) Agent1: Rt ← Rt ∪ pkA11 .
2) Agent1:
RL ← Γ.Revocation(pkA1 , skA1 , t,Rt).
• Vehicle Revocation. V ehicle12 is a vehicle. The
revocation of V ehicle12 has two phases. Agent1 adds
the public key pkV12 into the revocation list Rt in the
epoch t. Then, Agent1 runs Γ.Revocation and publishes
the new revocation list RL for revoking V ehicle12.
1) Agent1: Rt ← Rt ∪ pkV12 .
2) Agent1:
RL ← Γ.Revocation(pkA1 , skA1 , t,Rt).
• User Revocation. User1 can be revoked by
Company. The revocation of User1 has two phases.
Company adds the public key pkU1 into the revoca-
tion list Rt in the epoch t. Then, Company runs
Γ.Revocation and publishes the new revocation list RL
for revoking User1.
1) Server: Rt ← Rt ∪ pkU1 .
2) Server:
RL ← Γ.Revocation(pko, sko, t,Rt).
• Vehicle Ordering. User2 can order vehicles by
the following eight steps. User2 generates the message
MU2 including the a time-stamp TSA and the order
including the time, location, class and type of the ve-
hicle, etc. Then, User2 sends the message MU2 and
the signature of the message MU2 to Server. After
that, Server broadcasts message MU2 and the signa-
ture to all vehicles. All valid vehicles prepare mes-
sage (TS,MV ) and the corresponding signature where
MV contains information such as vehicle plate number.
Suppose V ehicle12 is the first one to send the message
(TSB,MV12) and the corresponding signature to Server
who will then forward this message to User2. The de-
tail of this protocol is as follows.
1) User2:
MU2 ← (TSA,Time, Location,Class,Type).
2) User2 → Server:
MU2 , σU2 ← Γ.Sign(skU2 , TU2 , RLt,MU2).
3) Server → V ehicles: MU2 , σU2 .
4) V ehicles: reject the connection if
Γ.Verify(pkU2 , pko, TSA,MU2 , σU2) = 0
or TSA is an invalid timestamp.
5) V ehicle12: MV12 ← (TSB,Plate No.).
6) V ehicle12 → Server:
MV12 , σV12 ← Γ.Sign(skV12 , TV12 , RLt,MV12).
7) Server → User2: MV12 , σV12 .
8) User2: reject the connection if
Γ.Verify(pkV12 , pko, TSB,MV12 , σV12) = 0
or TSB is an invalid timestamp.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we give the security analysis
based on the security requirements described in Sub-
section 5.1.
• The authorization requirement is satisfied by the
proposed protocol since only authorized users can gene-
rate a valid proxy signature to order a vehicle and only
authorized vehicles can take the order by generating a
valid response message.
• The revocation of a user or vehicle is done by
using the corresponding revocation mechanism in the
proposed proxy signature. Based on Theorem 3, we
can guarantee that a revoked user/vehicle is not able
to generate a signature that can pass the verification.
• Mutual authentication is achieved by the security
of the proxy signature. In particular, based on Theo-
rem 1, we can ensure that even Company or any Agent
cannot forge a valid proxy signature of a user or vehicle.
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• Message integrity is achieved due to the exten-
sional unforgeability under choose message attack (EU-
CMA) of the proxy signature scheme. Therefore, no one
is able to modify a message sent by the user or vehicle.
• Non-repudiation is also achieved due to the ex-
tensional unforgeability under choose message attack
(EU-CMA) of the proxy signature scheme and the fact
that a proxy signature is publicly verifiable.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a novel solution for proxy
signature with revocation and re-delegation. Compared
with the previous approaches, our solution does not re-
quire any third party. Also, the verifier does not need
to access the latest revocation list to verify a proxy
signature, and our scheme provides the property of re-
delegation and it has been proved secure against various
types of adversaries. Moreover, we presented a secure
vehicle ordering system as one of the applications of
the proposed revocable and re-delegable proxy signa-
ture scheme.
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